Theory and empirics suggest that, by curbing competition, incumbent electricity companies -also referred to as Vertically Integrated Utilities (VIUs) -can increase their profitability through combined ownership of generation and transmission and/or distribution networks. Because curbing competition is generally believed to be welfarereducing, EU law requires unbundling (separation) of the VIU networks. However, the EU allows its member states the choice between incomplete (legal) and complete (ownership) unbundling. There is tantalizing anecdotal evidence that VIUs have tried to influence this choice through questionable (and quite possibly illegal) means of persuasion. Such means of persuasion should be more readily available in countries with a more corrupted political culture. This paper shows that among the old EU member states (EU-15) countries which are perceived as more corrupt are indeed more likely to apply weaker forms of unbundling. Somewhat surprisingly, we do not obtain a similar finding for the new EU member states (NMS-10). We give a tentative explanation.
Introduction
The European electricity market is undergoing major changes. Prompted by EU legislation (most notably DIRECTIVE 2003 /54/EC 1 and REGULATION 1228 /2003 2 ), the EU member states are restructuring their electricity industry to allow for more competition which is widely believed to be welfare-enhancing. A major complication is that, at the outset, the electricity markets were almost completely controlled by large, Vertically Integrated Utilities (VIU) that used to be regulated state monopolies. These
VIUs typically still own almost all generators, as well as transmission and/or the distribution networks 3 . Such ownership pattern is believed to be an obstacle for free competition (e.g. European Commission Competition DG, 2006, p.149) .
To prevent VIUs from using their influence to reduce competition, the EU has required its member states to unbundle (separate) their generation and network activities. Many members, however, have been slow in implementing these directives and many have chosen the weaker (but permitted) form of unbundling. These developments, and the fact that weaker forms of unbundling are allowed at all, are widely believed (e.g. European
Commission Competition DG, 2006, p.144-148) , to be welfare-reducing. These developments suggest that the pertinent political, legislative, and regulatory processes have unduly been influenced.
We conjecture (motivated by tantalizing anecdotal evidence and by a well-established literature on legislative and regulatory capture) that a significant part of the timing of the implementation of unbundling regimes and the choice of weaker forms of unbundling regimes, as well as the fact that they are possible at all, can be explained by questionable (and possibly illegal) influence activities by VIUs. We conjecture specifically that such influence activities are more effective in countries where the policy and regulatory process is more easily influenced.
We will perform ordered logit regressions on a panel data set and perform several additional tests for robustness. The results confirm our hypothesis and additionally present tentative evidence for the use of strategic implementation strategies in the EU accession by the New Member States (NMS-10)
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we first give examples of the welfare-reducing effects of having a fully integrated VIU and then discuss types of unbundling. We also formulate more specifically our conjecture and present a summary of the data that we use. In section 3 we explain the sources of our data and describe our strategy for analyzing the data. In section 4 we report our results. In section 5 we conclude with a discussion.
Motivation
The dominance of large Vertically Integrated Utilities (VIU) that used to be (regulated) state monopolies is arguably the major obstacle for creating both a single market in energy and more competition. Especially the fact that VIUs own both generators and (transmission/distribution) networks is problematic, as it allows VIUs to use their network ownership to increase their profits and hinder competition. To prevent VIUs from using control over their networks to reduce competition, the EU required member states to separate their transmission and distribution networks from generation. The EU distinguishes five main types of such unbundling:
1) Unified ownership requires no unbundling; both network and generation activities continue to be owned and managed by the same company.
2) Accounting unbundling is the least drastic form of separation; separate accounts must be kept for the network activities and generation activities to prevent cross subsidization.
3) Functional unbundling (also called management unbundling) requires, in addition to keeping separate accounts, that the operational activities and management are separated for transmission and generation activities. transmission company 13 . We therefore conjecture that part of the variation in the choice of unbundling regime, and the speed of implementation, can be explained by influence activities of VIUs. These activities may be legal (e.g., transparent lobbying activities) or may include questionable (and possibly illegal) strategies such as under-the-table payments to allegedly independent lobbyists to effect public opinion and the legislative and regulatory process.
For example, the VIU can try to bribe politicians or "independent" specialists to foment opposition against ownership unbundling. A recent scandal in the Netherlands illustrates such a strategy. In January 2006, it became known that energy companies Nuon, Eneco, Essent, and Delta had secretly promised, contingent on the Netherlands government deciding against ownership unbundling of the distribution network, a "success fee" of EURO 1,7 million to IMSA, an "independent", idealistic, environmentally oriented consultancy company 14 . IMSA had forcefully argued against ownership unbundling of energy networks in Dutch media and in an IMSA consultancy report (Van Dieren, Tuininga, and van Soest, 2006) . This example is suggestive of the value of weaker unbundling for energy companies but it begs the question whether the Dutch scandal was an isolated incidence, or one that was unique only in that it had been exposed.
The effect of such questionable influence activities depends on the integrity of legislative and regulatory processes. Direct data that measure the integrity of such processes do not exist. We therefore proxy it with data on the perceived corruption of a country: the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International 15 .
13 Energy Company Essent provides illustrative examples of the rhetoric against ownership unbundling brought up by incumbent VIUs. Essent states that unified ownership of the network provides protection against possible foreign take-over; "We are now being chopped up, ready for swallowing by large foreign groups with headquarters in Munich (sic!) or Paris" (http://www.essentfinance.nl/pressroom/release36.jsp). 14 See http://www.imsa.nl/ for the idealistically flavored mission statements of IMSA. The director of IMSA and benefactor of the success fee, Mr. van Dieren, kept a public appearance as an independent environmental activist. He is a member of the Club of Rome and the founder of a Dutch militant environmental organization called "milieudefensie". 15 The CPI is a well-established (e.g., Mauro, 1995; Treisman, 2000) assessment instrument that assigns countries a score between 1 (perceived as very corrupt) and 10 (perceived as hardly corrupt at all). The score is based on a number (up to 18) of sources, not all of them just about perception. The CPI of 2005 was based on 16 sources from 10 independent institutions (Lambsdorff, 2005) . We also use the CPI as a regressor to study how the quality of implementation of the unbundling regime is influenced by the integrity of legislative and regulatory processes.
The assessment of the quality of implementation consists of the results of a questionnaire that the European Commission administers and that includes the following four questions:
1. Does the VIU publish its accounts?
2. Does the VIU employ a compliance officer?
3. Do the unbundled activities have a separate corporate identity?
4. Are the unbundled activities located at separate locations?
Data and analysis
The data on unbundling regimes and the quality of implementation were collected from reports of the EU Commission (2002, 2003, 2004, 05.01.2005, 15. does not matter whether a legislative or regulatory change was enacted in January or December. We can not think of any reason why our (strong) results reported below should be significantly affected by these caveats.
The data on the CPI were obtained from Transparency International 17 . The data on per capita GDP (corrected for PPP), GDP (corrected for PPP), electricity prices, wages, and net electricity import relative to total available production were obtained from Eurostat 18 .
To test our hypothesis, we ran ordered logit regressions with transmission unbundling regime and quality of implementation, respectively, as dependent variable, and CPI and various controlling variables as regressors. where the relevant group of variables is defined as follows:
• t_unbund stands for the transmission unbundling regime implemented and can take the categorical values i ∈ {Unified ownership, Accounting unbundling, Functional unbundling, Legal unbundling, Ownership unbundling}.
• CPI stands for the Corruption Perception Index.
• t stands for time trend.
• GDP_pc stands for the per capita Gross Domestic Product (corrected for purchasing power parity).
• GDP stands for Gross Domestic Product (corrected for purchasing power parity)
• NetElecIMP stands for the net import of electricity relative to the total net generation of electricity 19 . Included to control for the possible influence a net position as a buyer could have on the unbundling policy.
• EU_NMS is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the country is a New Member State (NMS) of the EU.
• SmallIsolated is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the country has an electricity system that is small and isolated from the other EU countries; this is the case for The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality indicates that all variables -apart from the dummy variables -are normally distributed. We assume that they are clustered by country, but otherwise independent. We therefore use the robust Huber/White/sandwich estimator clustered by country for the variance.
4. Results Table 3 shows the results for several model specifications 21 . Model 1 includes all observations and all controlling variables. *** Significant at the 1% confidence level ** Significant at the 5% confidence level * Significant at the 10% confidence level transmission unbundling before July 2004. We decided that these facts are substantial enough to have an individual effect on the choice of unbundling regime and therefore included a dummy variable. 21 We obtained basically the same results using survival analysis, an alternative method of data analysis. In the survival analysis, we categorized a country as being "alive" as long as it has not implemented ownership unbundling, a country "fails" at the moment it implements ownership unbundling. As mentioned in section 3, our observations are most likely correlated by countries; this reduces the degrees of freedom below the number of observations. Our use of six explanatory variables further decreases the degrees of freedom. To avoid a possible overfitting of the model, we performed ordered logit regressions of the transmission unbundling regime on the CPI alone and on the CPI and one more variable, which results in six regressions. Of these six regressions, three were significant on the .01 level, two on the .05 level and one, on the CPI and on the EU_NMS, was insignificant. The insignificant result is remarkable, and indicates the existence of a negative interaction effect between the variables CPI and EU_NMS.
Differences in EU-15 and NMS-10
To assess whether there are indeed differences in the effect of the CPI for old and new EU member states, we perform separate regressions for old EU member states (EU-15; model 2a and 2b) and for new EU member states (NMS-10; model 3). In model 2a the effect of CPI becomes more strongly significant, even though the number of observations 22 It takes time to decide on, and implement, an unbundling regime. It can therefore be argued that the unbundling regime should be regressed on the lagged CPI. However, the CPI is a moving average over the past three years; the CPI of a certain year is based on numerous indexes and reports over a time period including the two previous years (Lambsdorf, 2005 The effect of NetImportElec (P<.1) is now weakly significant; net importers of electricity are more likely to implement rigorous transmission unbundling, or in other words; net exporters of electricity are less likely to implement rigorous transmission unbundling. A possible explanation is that when a country exports electricity the ownership of the transmission is seen as a strategic asset to be able to capitalize on the profits of selling electricity, hence a lower likelihood of the implementation of rigorous unbundling. A linear regression of NetImportElec on the transmission regime (P < .05) and other explanatory variables indicates that the causation could also work in the opposite direction: a VIU that is less unbundled has more chances to use its ownership of the transmission strategically to maintain a position as a net exporter by facilitating exports, but not imports.
In model 3 however the effect of the CPI in NMS-10 countries is opposite to what we found before; more corrupt NMS-10 countries tend to implement more rigorous transmission unbundling. Also the effect of wealth is reversed; richer NMS-10 countries (as measured by GDP_pc, the per capita GDP) are more likely to implement rigorous transmission unbundling. Further has the economic size of the country (as measured by GDP) has a strongly significant effect; economically larger countries are less likely to implements rigorous transmission unbundling.
A possible explanation is that the reverse CPI effect is spurious; indeed we have reasons to suspect that the transmission unbundling regime has not always been reported accurately for NMS-10 countries. In the case of Latvia our robustness check (see appendix) indicates that misreporting could have caused a spurious relationship; running the ordered logit regression for NMS-10 countries using the data provided by the Latvian 24 Ordered logit regressions of the transmission regime on the CPI and one or more other explanatory variables are all significant at the .05 level as long as the variable GDPpc, the per capita GDP, is included. The variable GDPpc has a positive correlation of .67 with the CPI while its effect (negative) is opposite to the effect of the CPI (positive). Therefore exclusion of the variable GDPpc would partially mask the positive effect of the CPI. However, it seems likely that the occurrence of misreporting is related to the level of corruption in the NMS-10 countries. After all, in the pre-accession stage the European Commission has exerted strong pressure on the NMS-countries to show clear signs of reform to be eligible for EU membership. Compliance with the unbundling requirements is a step towards creating a liberal market-economy and a way for an accession country to signal its commitment for reform to the EU 26 . Especially for very corrupt countries such formal compliance is a cheap means relative to curbing anticompetitive practices and governmental corruption. This might explain why more corrupt counties choose (at least formally) more rigorous unbundling. Furthermore, this pressure was most likely more intense for economically smaller countries, as they had less bargaining power vis-à-vis to the EU. This would explain that economically large countries (as measured by the GDP)
are less likely to implement rigorous transmission unbundling.
Marginal effects for EU-15 and NMS-10
To explore the size of the effect of the CPI on the transmission unbundling regime 27 , we calculate the marginal effect of the CPI on the probability of choosing an unbundling regime. Likewise, using the data from the Latvian regulator in a survival analysis for the NMS-10 countries renders the coefficient on the CPI (P<.58) insignificant. 26 Prior to the accession of a selected group of candidate countries in 2004, these candidate countries were evaluated by the European Commission, see for example the European Economy Enlargement Papers. As can be seen in the European Economy Enlargement Papers, one of the criteria on which the candidate countries were evaluated was the state of liberalization and regulation of the energy sector. The European Economy Enlargement Papers are available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/enlargementpapers_en.htm 27 We expected that the same effect could be found for the unbundling regime for distribution. Running an ordered logit regression of the distribution unbundling regime on the CPI and controlling variables results in a positive (0.27) but insignificant (P<0.52) coefficient. A possible explanation is that distribution unbundling was scheduled to be implemented later (July 2007) than transmission unbundling (July 2004) , and that the effect of the CPI will show up significantly once data over [2005] [2006] [2007] Table 4 shows that an increase in the CPI with one point (the country is less corrupt) increases the likelihood for the average EU-15 country to chose ownership unbundling for transmission with 33%. Likewise, an increase in the CPI (the country is more corrupt) decreases the probability to have legal, functional or accounting unbundling. Table 5 shows that an increase in the CPI with one point (the country is less corrupt) lowers the likelihood for the average NMS-10 country to chose ownership unbundling for transmission with 4.2%. It lowers the likelihood to choose legal unbundling for transmission with 2.2%. Likewise, an increase in the CPI (the country is more corrupt) increases the probability to have functional or accounting unbundling.
Additional tests
To further illustrate the importance of the CPI, we used our regressions to predict for our observations the binary choice between ownership unbundling and less binding unbundling regimes (legal, functional, account and none) 28 . Inclusion of the CPI generally adds around 9% till 11% to the percentage of correct predictions. The same result follows when we only focus on the data for EU-15. Focusing on the data for NMS-10, we used our regressions to predict for our observations the binary choice between ownership or legal unbundling and less binding unbundling regimes (functional, account and none). Inclusion of the CPI then adds around 6% till 8% to the percentage of correct predictions.
The CPI also has, as assessed through a questionnaire that the European Commission administers, a significant effect on the quality of implementation. Performing a binary logit regression on the CPI and controlling variables resulted in significant coefficients for the first two questions (see Table 6 ). Mapping the answers to these questions into affirmative (=1) or negative (=0) and pretending that the answer to each question has the same weight, an ordered logit regression of the total score on the CPI and the controlling variables displayed in Table 2 gives a highly significant result (P<0.000).
A final question is whether we can see an increase in rents from less unbundling 29 . Here we consider the industrial electricity price relative to the domestic electricity price. We expect this indicator to be higher for countries with less rigorously unbundled transmission networks. Industrial consumers have more bargaining power than domestic consumers and therefore profit more from rigorous unbundling. 30 A higher indicator value therefore reflects the captivity of industrial consumers and can be used as a proxy for rents captured by the VIU. Indeed the regression of the indicator on the unbundling system (and controlling variables) shows a positive (0.1) and significant effect (p<0.05).
Discussion
For the EU member states we found a significant and robust effect of corruption on the realized unbundling regime; countries that are more corrupt are more likely to have chosen weak unbundling regimes.
The fact that more corrupt or less accountable politicians allow less unbundling is an indication that less unbundling is a way to grant VIUs higher rents. Obviously this idea has not been generally recognized; EU laws treat legal and ownership unbundling as equivalently suitable. Our results therefore also contribute to the claim that weaker unbundling enables VIUs to capture higher rents.
This effect is even stronger when we focus only on the old EU member states (EU-15).
Our result adds empirical evidence to a literature that casts doubt on the wisdom of allowing a weak unbundling regime which facilitates the continuing existence of large utilities that are effectively still integrated. Our results suggests specifically that the questionable practices of persuasion that were uncovered in the Netherlands (and that we discussed in section 2) may be systemic; VIUs in countries that are more corrupt might use, apart from legal lobbying channels, also illegal means to further their interests.
The analysis focused on only the NMS-10 shows a weaker but statistically effect in the opposite direction. In our framework, this suggests that NMS-10 countries reported early adoption of formal EU requirements as a cheap means to increase their chances to be judged eligible for accession into the EU. This strategy should be especially attractive for corrupt countries; countries that find it costly to implement other EU requirements as curbing anticompetitive practices and governmental corruption.
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Public Utilities Regulation Commission (2005) . The correction in the data lowers the significance of the coefficient on the CPI in model 1 (p<.1), and leaves the significance in model 3 (for the EU-15) unaffected. The coefficient on the CPI in model 4 becomes insignificant (P<.34).
3. The effect of the CPI on the percentage of correct predictions.
To further illustrate the importance of the CPI, we used our regressions to predict for our observations the binary choice between ownership unbundling and any unbundling regime less than ownership unbundling (legal, functional, account and none). We created a new variable, Ownership. The variable receives the value 1 if ownership unbundling regime has been implemented; it receives the value 0 otherwise. The variable Ownership has 110 observations, 33 of which are ones (ownership unbundling has been implemented) and 77 of which are zeros (an unbundling regime lower than ownership has been implemented).
We use our regressions to predict for our observations the binary choice between ownership unbundling and any unbundling regime less than ownership unbundling (legal, functional, account and none). • The observation on Luxemburg is missing.
• Does not contain data on NMS-10.
2002
Second DG Tren report (Commission of the European Communities, 2002),
• For the EU-15 member states, two observations are categorized as a mix of functional and legal unbundling and one
